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Not All Factors Crowd Equally: Modeling, Measuring, and Trading on Alpha Decay

Chorok Lee

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We derive a specific functional form for factor alpha decay -- hyperbolic decay alpha(t) = K/(1+lambda*t) -- from a game-theoretic equilibrium model, and test it against linear and exponential alternatives. Using eight Fama-French factors (1963--2024), we find: (1) Hyperbolic decay fits mechanical factors. Momentum exhibits clear hyperbolic decay (R^2 = 0.65), outperforming linear (0.51) and exponential (0.61) baselines -- validating the equilibrium foundation. (2) Not all factors crowd equally. Mechanical factors (momentum, reversal) fit the model; judgment-based factors (value, quality) do not -- consistent with a signal-ambiguity taxonomy paralleling Hua and Sun's "barriers to entry." (3) Crowding accelerated post-2015. Out-of-sample, the model over-predicts remaining alpha (0.30 vs. 0.15), correlating with factor ETF growth (rho = -0.63). (4) Average returns are efficiently priced. Crowding-based factor selection fails to generate alpha (Sharpe: 0.22 vs. 0.39 factor momentum benchmark). (5) Crowding predicts tail risk. Out-of-sample (2001--2024), crowded reversal factors show 1.7--1.8x higher crash probability (bottom decile returns), while crowded momentum shows lower crash risk (0.38x, p = 0.006). Our findings extend equilibrium crowding models (DeMiguel et al.) to temporal dynamics and show that crowding predicts crashes, not means -- useful for risk management, not alpha generation.

Date: 2025-12
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