Reservation of Judgment and Robust Collective Decisions

Leo Kurata and Kensei Nakamura

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: This paper studies preference aggregation under ambiguity when agents have incomplete preference relations due to imprecise beliefs. We introduce the "dual" of the Pareto principle, which respects unanimity among individuals, including those with unexpressed opinions. Our first theorem shows that, in most cases, this principle leads to a dictatorial rule in taste aggregation. We argue that this stems from the problem of spurious unanimity, even when the individuals have the same prior set. By weakening the above principle to avoid respecting spurious unanimity, the second theorem characterizes novel belief-aggregation rules, under which society does not discard any combination of plausible priors.

Date: 2025-12
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