Diversity in Schumpeterian games

Fryderyk Falniowski and El\.zbieta Pli\'s

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Abstract: We examine the impact of a change in diversity introduced by a new product on the evolution of an economic system. Modeling Schumpeterian competition as a population game with a unique, attracting, evolutionarily stable state (the Schumpeterian state), in which both innovators and imitators coexist, we examine how the Schumpeterian state evolves depending on the properties of the new product developed by innovators. This way, we demonstrate that the change in diversity is one of the spiritus movens of innovation, influencing the process of creative destruction.

Date: 2025-12
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