Adaptive Agents in Spatial Double-Auction Markets: Modeling the Emergence of Industrial Symbiosis

Matthieu Mastio, Paul Saves, Benoit Gaudou and Nicolas Verstaevel

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Industrial symbiosis fosters circularity by enabling firms to repurpose residual resources, yet its emergence is constrained by socio-spatial frictions that shape costs, matching opportunities, and market efficiency. Existing models often overlook the interaction between spatial structure, market design, and adaptive firm behavior, limiting our understanding of where and how symbiosis arises. We develop an agent-based model where heterogeneous firms trade byproducts through a spatially embedded double-auction market, with prices and quantities emerging endogenously from local interactions. Leveraging reinforcement learning, firms adapt their bidding strategies to maximize profit while accounting for transport costs, disposal penalties, and resource scarcity. Simulation experiments reveal the economic and spatial conditions under which decentralized exchanges converge toward stable and efficient outcomes. Counterfactual regret analysis shows that sellers' strategies approach a near Nash equilibrium, while sensitivity analysis highlights how spatial structures and market parameters jointly govern circularity. Our model provides a basis for exploring policy interventions that seek to align firm incentives with sustainability goals, and more broadly demonstrates how decentralized coordination can emerge from adaptive agents in spatially constrained markets.

Date: 2025-12
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in AAMAS 2026, Paphos, IFAAMAS, 10 pages

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2512.17979 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2512.17979

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().