Equilibrium Liquidity and Risk Offsetting in Decentralised Markets

Fay\c{c}al Drissi, Xuchen Wu and Sebastian Jaimungal

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Abstract: We develop an economic model of decentralised exchanges (DEXs) in which risk-averse liquidity providers (LPs) manage risk in a centralised exchange (CEX) based on preferences, information, and trading costs. Rational, risk-averse LPs anticipate the frictions associated with replication and manage risk primarily by reducing the reserves supplied to the DEX. Greater aversion reduces the equilibrium viability of liquidity provision, resulting in thinner markets and lower trading volumes. Greater uninformed demand supports deeper liquidity, whereas higher fundamental price volatility erodes it. Finally, while moderate anticipated price changes can improve LP performance, larger changes require more intensive trading in the CEX, generate higher replication costs, and induce LPs to reduce liquidity supply.

Date: 2025-12, Revised 2025-12
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