Existence of Optimal Mechanisms for Selling Multiple Goods: An Elementary Proof

Sergiu Hart and Noam Nisan

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Abstract: We provide an elementary proof that revenue-maximizing mechanisms exist in multi-parameter settings whenever the distribution of valuations has finite expectation.

Date: 2026-01
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