Bayesian Persuasion with Selective Disclosure

Yifan Dai, Drew Fudenberg and Harry Pei

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: A sender first publicly commits to an experiment and then can privately run additional experiments and selectively disclose their outcomes to a receiver. The sender has private information about the maximal number of additional experiments they can perform (i.e., their type). We show that the sender cannot attain their commitment payoff in any equilibrium if (i) the receiver is sufficiently uncertain about their type and (ii) the sender could benefit from selective disclosure after conducting their full-commitment optimal experiment. Otherwise, there can be equilibria where the sender obtains their commitment payoff.

Date: 2026-01
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