The Replicator-Optimization Mechanism: A Scale-Relative Formalism for Persistence-Conditioned Dynamics with a Conditional Consent-Friction Instantiation

Murad Farzulla

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Abstract: Persistence models often conflate propagation, survival, and cross-scale loss. The Replicator-Optimization Mechanism (ROM) is a replicator-mutator template separating baseline weight, bounded survival, and a transfer kernel at a declared scale. Its equation conserves mass but guarantees neither invariance, convergence, a potential, nor a preferred scale. For finite static density-independent continuous time, an irreducible weighted kernel yields a unique positive Perron-Frobenius composition; discrete-time power convergence needs primitivity. The componentwise ranking proved here is guaranteed under exact uniform-residual transfer. Strong lumpability gives universal first-order transfer closure, and blockwise effective fitness gives an exact quotient. An institutional instantiation uses normalized stakes, signed preference-decision alignment, information loss, and descriptive effective voice. It specifies conditional survival, not legitimacy or normative authority. A companion mixed-motive MARL battery reports exploratory evidence against the implemented proxy ratio in its environment: a positive signed target-coordinate-correlation effect survives held-out evaluation under shared-state contention, while a reduced feasible-centred frozen-policy crossing reverses the predicted correlation-noise interaction. The treatment varies ideal-point correlation inside a fixed reward family, not objective- or reward-function alignment. Lean checks mapped algebraic identities and scalar monotonicities, not the stationary theorem, empirical mapping, or normative bridge. ROM is an assumptions ledger and model-construction discipline, not a cross-substrate law.

Date: 2026-01, Revised 2026-08
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