Learning Market Making with Closing Auctions

Julius Graf and Thibaut Mastrolia

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Abstract: In this work, we investigate a market making execution problem on a trading session in which a continuous phase on a limit order book is followed by a closing auction. Whereas standard optimal market making models typically rely on terminal inventory penalties to manage end-of-day risk, ignoring the significant liquidity events available in closing auctions, we propose a deep reinforcement learning framework, consisting of a Deep Q-Network and its continuous-control actor-critic extensions (DDPG, TD3 and SAC), that explicitly incorporates this mechanism. We introduce a market making framework designed to explicitly anticipate the closing auction, continuously refining the projected clearing price as the trading session evolves. We develop a generative stochastic market model to simulate the trading session and to emulate the market. Our theoretical model and these deep reinforcement learning methods are applied on the generator in two settings: (1) when the mid price follows a rough Heston model with generative data from this stochastic model; and (2) when the mid price corresponds to historical data of assets from the S&P 500 index and the performance of our algorithm is compared with stylized reference benchmarks from optimal market making.

Date: 2026-01, Revised 2026-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-mst
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