Bank Runs With and Without Bank Failure

Sergio Correia, Stephan Luck and Emil Verner

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We study the causes and consequences of bank runs using a novel dataset on bank runs in the United States from 1863 to 1934. Applying natural language processing to historical newspapers, we identify 4,049 runs on individual banks. Runs are considerably more likely in weak banks but also occur in strong banks, especially in response to negative news about the real economy or the broader banking system. However, runs typically only result in failure for banks with weak fundamentals. Strong banks survive runs through various mechanisms, including interbank cooperation, equity injections, public signals of strength, and suspension of convertibility. At the local level, bank failures (with and without runs) translate into substantially larger declines in deposits and lending than runs without failures. Our findings suggest that poor bank fundamentals are necessary for bank runs to translate into failure and for bank distress to generate severe economic consequences.

Date: 2026-01
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