Stablecoin Design with Adversarial-Robust Multi-Agent Systems via Trust-Weighted Signal Aggregation

Shengwei You, Aditya Joshi, Andrey Kuehlkamp and Jarek Nabrzyski

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Abstract: Algorithmic stablecoins promise decentralized monetary stability by maintaining a target peg through programmatic reserve management. Yet, their reserve controllers remain vulnerable to regime-blind optimization, calibrating risk parameters on fair-weather data while ignoring tail events that precipitate cascading failures. The March 2020 Black Thursday collapse, wherein MakerDAO's collateral auctions yielded $8.3M in losses and a 15% peg deviation, exposed a critical gap: existing models like SAS systematically omit extreme volatility regimes from covariance estimates, producing allocations optimal in expectation but catastrophic under adversarial stress. We present MVF-Composer, a trust-weighted Mean-Variance Frontier reserve controller incorporating a novel Stress Harness for risk-state estimation. Our key insight is deploying multi-agent simulations as adversarial stress-testers: heterogeneous agents (traders, liquidity providers, attackers) execute protocol actions under crisis scenarios, exposing reserve vulnerabilities before they manifest on-chain. We formalize a trust-scoring mechanism T: A -> [0,1] that down-weights signals from agents exhibiting manipulative behavior, ensuring the risk-state estimator remains robust to signal injection and Sybil attacks. Across 1,200 randomized scenarios with injected Black-Swan shocks (10% collateral drawdown, 50% sentiment collapse, coordinated redemption attacks), MVF-Composer reduces peak peg deviation by 57% and mean recovery time by 3.1x relative to SAS baselines. Ablation studies confirm the trust layer accounts for 23% of stability gains under adversarial conditions, achieving 72% adversarial agent detection. Our system runs on commodity hardware, requires no on-chain oracles beyond standard price feeds, and provides a reproducible framework for stress-testing DeFi reserve policies.

Date: 2026-01
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