"Sail Fast, Then Wait" in First-come, First-served Port Queues: Information Sharing for Sustainable Shipping

Ayato Kitadai, Shunta Yoshimura, Takuya Nakashima, Noora Torpo, Rei Miratsu, Naoki Mizutani and Nariaki Nishino

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Abstract: This study develops a novel class of queueing game to explain a common practice in cargo shipping "Sail Fast, Then Wait" (SFTW), and demonstrates that resolving information asymmetry among ships can deconcentrate port arrival times. We formulate a competitive navigating environment as an incomplete information game where players strategically decide their arrival time within heterogeneous feasible sets under First-Come, First-Served port policy. Our results show that in incomplete information settings, SFTW emerges as the unique symmetric equilibrium. Conversely, under complete information, the set of equilibria expands, allowing for slower and more environmentally friendly actions without compromising service order. We further quantitatively evaluate the effect of information enrichment based on empirical data. Our findings suggest that the prevalence of technologies enabling ships to infer others' private information can effectively reduce SFTW and enable more energy-efficient and environmentally sustainable operations.

Date: 2026-02
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