Distributional Preferences for Market Design

Federico Echenique, Teddy Mekonnen and M. Bumin Yenmez

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We develop a general framework for incorporating distributional preferences in market design. We identify the structural properties of these preferences that guarantee the path independence of choice rules. In decentralized settings, a greedy rule uniquely maximizes these preferences; in centralized markets, the associated deferred-acceptance mechanism uniquely implements them. This framework subsumes canonical models, such as reserves and matroids, while accommodating complex objectives involving intersectional identities that lie beyond the scope of existing approaches. Our analysis provides unified axiomatic foundations and comparative statics for a broad class of distributional policies.

Date: 2026-02
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