Selective Disclosure in Overlapping Generations

Nemanja Antic and Harry Pei

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We develop an overlapping generations model where each agent observes a verifiable private signal about the state and, with positive probability, also receives signals disclosed by his predecessor. The agent then takes an action and decides which signals to pass on. Each agent's action has a positive externality on his predecessor and his optimal action increases in his belief about the state. We show that as the probability that messages reach the next generation approaches one, agents become increasingly selective in disclosing information. In the limit, all signals except for the most favorable ones will be concealed.

Date: 2026-02, Revised 2026-02
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2602.09406 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2602.09406

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().