Network Interventions: Targeting Agents or Targeting Links?

Krishna Dasaratha and Anant Shah

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Consider a network game with linear best responses and spillovers between players, and let agents endogenously choose their links. A planner considers interventions to subsidize actions and/or links between players, aiming to maximize a welfare function depending on equilibrium actions. The structure of the optimal intervention depends on whether links provide non-negative intrinsic value to agents. When they do, it is optimal to focus only on subsidizing actions. When the intrinsic value of links is negative, we give conditions for including link subsidies to be optimal. This reverses the basic structure of the optimal intervention in settings with exogenous links.

Date: 2026-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-net
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