Decentralized Trading Networks: Equilibria and Fairness

Simon Finster, Paul W. Goldberg, Edwin Lock and Matilde Tullii

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We explore stability and fairness considerations in decentralized networked markets with bilateral contracts, building on the trading networks framework [Hatfield et al., 2013]. In our trading network game, we show that a well-defined subset of Nash equilibria can be supported as competitive equilibria. Considering an offer-based trading dynamic as well as a stochastic price clock market, we prove new convergence results to Nash equilibrium and competitive equilibrium, providing a rationale for stability properties in decentralized, dynamic trading networks. Turning to the tension between fairness and (core) stability, we prove several negative results: inessential agents always receive zero utility in any core outcome, and even essential agents can get zero utility in all core outcomes.

Date: 2026-02
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2602.20868 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2602.20868

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().