Generalized Multidimensional Contests with Asymmetric Players: Equilibrium and Optimal Prize Design

Siyuan Fan, Zhonghong Kuang and Jingfeng Lu

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We study $n$-dimensional Tullock contests between two players with heterogeneous effort costs. We establish sharp bounds on discriminatory power $r$ ensuring that equilibrium is unique and pure across prize rules and cost asymmetries: $r\leq1/\lceil n/2\rceil$ when prizes depend only on the number of victories across all dimensions, and $r\leq1/n$ when they may also depend on player identity. An effort-maximizing rule splits the prize unless one player wins by a sufficient margin in the first case, and gives the weaker player a possibly zero headstart in the second. When both bounds hold, restricting prizes to victory counts alone can be costless despite unequal costs, but the percentage loss in total effort weakly increases with asymmetry.

Date: 2026-02, Revised 2026-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-spo
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