(Ab)using Indifference: Purification in Communication and Repeated Games

Alistair Barton

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Recent papers in communication games construct equilibria by conditioning an agent's strategy on private, payoff-irrelevant information. I prove this is impossible in general games if there is any amount of realistic privacy in agents' preferences, generalizing previous results from cheap talk games to mediated cheap talk and communication with receiver commitment. Applying the result to repeated games with public+conditionally independent private monitoring, all equilibria without private randomization are perfect public equilibria, and non-trivial belief free equilibria are impossible. This result can be avoided if information is slightly correlated, or pay-off relevant. Due to undesirable properties of public perfect equilibria in some settings, I argue for further study of belief-based equilibria to understand equilibria of repeated games with noisy monitoring.

Date: 2026-02
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