Making Serial Dictatorships Fair

Adam Hamdan

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: In priority-based matching, serial dictatorship (SD) is simple, strategyproof, and Pareto efficient, but not free of justified envy (i.e. fair). This paper studies how to optimally order agents in SD based on their priorities to minimize justified envy. I show that this problem can be formulated in terms of rank aggregation and identify a novel connection with the social choice literature: for any distribution of agents' preferences and any capacity structure, the serial order that minimizes the expected number of justified envy cases coincides with the (weighted) Kemeny ranking of agents' priorities (Kemeny, 1959).

Date: 2026-03, Revised 2026-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-mic
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