The coordination gap in frontier AI safety policies

Isaak Mengesha

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Frontier AI Safety Policies concentrate on prevention: capability evaluations, deployment gates, and usage constraints, while neglecting the capacity to coordinate responses when prevention fails. We argue this coordination gap is structural: investments in ecosystem robustness yield diffuse benefits but concentrated costs, generating systematic underinvestment. Drawing on risk regimes in nuclear safety, pandemic preparedness, and critical infrastructure, we propose that similar mechanisms (precommitment, shared protocols, standing coordination venues) could be adapted to frontier AI governance. Closing the gap requires cross-actor "note-exchange" of ex ante if-then response logic, exposing not only triggers but the decision processes that convert signals into actions. Without such architecture, institutions cannot learn from failures at the pace of relevance.

Date: 2026-02, Revised 2026-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2603.10015 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2603.10015

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().