Delegated Information Provision

Francesco Bilotta, Christoph Carnehl and Justus Preusser

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: A designer relies on an experimenter to provide information to a decision maker, but the experimenter has incentives to persuade rather than merely transmit information. Anticipating this motive, the designer can restrict the set of admissible experiments, but cannot prevent the experimenter from garbling any admissible experiment. We model this situation as delegation over experiments. The optimal delegation set can be obtained by comparing maximally informative experiments among those the experimenter has no incentive to garble. When the experimenter's preferences are $S$-shaped, we fully characterize such experiments as double censorship. Relative to the full delegation outcome, upper censorship, double censorship features an intermediate pooling region, inducing a smaller pooling region for the highest states. We show that the designer strictly benefits from imposing a nontrivial delegation set to constrain the experimenter's ability to persuade while retaining valuable information provision.

Date: 2026-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-exp and nep-mic
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