Matching with Choice Correspondences: Persistence and Acyclicity

Varun Bansal, Mihir Bhattacharya and Ojasvi Khare ()

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Abstract: We study stable matching when agents are described by choice correspondences rather than preferences. For many-to-many markets, we introduce individually rational persistence (IRP) and show that substitutability (SUB) and IRP give a stable matching, through a simple algorithm with no proposing side. For one-to-one markets, SUB and binary acyclicity (BA) give a stable matching. Combining the two, SUB with IRP on firms and BA on workers gives a stable many-to-one matching. Because IRP and BA are each independent of irrelevance of rejected contracts (IRC), our conditions offer an alternative to path independence.

Date: 2026-03, Revised 2026-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm, nep-des and nep-mic
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