Stable Matching with Choice Correspondences: Beyond Path Independence

Varun Bansal, Mihir Bhattacharya and Ojasvi Khare ()

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Abstract: We study stable matching with agents' choice correspondences as primitives. For many-to-many markets we introduce Individually Rational Persistence (IRP), which admits status-quo persistence, and show that substitutability (SUB) and IRP guarantee a stable matching; the constructive proof yields a symmetric matching algorithm with no proposing side and long-term contracts. For one-to-one markets we introduce replacement-based stability and show that SUB together with binary acyclicity (BA) guarantees existence. Combining the two, in the many-to-one setting, where SUB and irrelevance of rejected contracts (IRC) guarantee stability, we show that SUB with IRP on firms and BA on workers guarantees existence. We show that, in the presence of SUB, IRC is not necessary for existence in any of the three models, so stable matchings exist outside the domain of path independence.

Date: 2026-03, Revised 2026-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm, nep-des and nep-mic
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