EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Financial Intermediaries and Capital Centralization in Global FDI: A Network Approach to Tracing Transnational Corporate Control

Alessio Abeltino, Tiziano Bacaloni, Andrea Bernardini, Francesco Giancaterini and Andrea Pannone

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Understanding how corporate control concentrates in modern ownership systems is crucial in an economy increasingly shaped by cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Rather than expanding productive capacity, these operations reorganize ownership and control over existing firms through complex transnational structures involving financial intermediaries, holding companies, and investment vehicles. As a result, corporate control may become highly concentrated even when formal ownership appears fragmented. This paper examines how foreign direct investments-related capital centralization reshapes firm-level governance by tracing how control converges on individual companies through multi-layered ownership networks. Focusing on two strategically relevant Italian firms, we show that control is rarely exercised solely by ultimate owners, but instead arises from the interaction of a small set of financially interconnected intermediaries operating along transnational ownership chains. The results show how small equity stakes translate into substantial governance power, highlighting the role of financial intermediation and raising implications for strategic autonomy and economic sovereignty in key sectors.

Date: 2026-04, Revised 2026-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cfn and nep-net
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2604.02875 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2604.02875

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().

 
Page updated 2026-04-25
Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2604.02875