The Screening Cost of Liquidity

Rui Sun

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: A principal with cheap capital optimally forces her counterparty to borrow at above-market rates. The reason: the form of finance is a screening device. Advances provide liquidity but pool types; contingent transfers separate types, but, because they are not pledgeable, impose financing costs. The optimal contract preserves outside-finance exposure to maintain screening power. Two sufficient statistics pin down the optimal advance share. With complementary counterparties, a uniform subsidy that cheapens finance across every relationship can reduce the value of each. This explains the coexistence of early payment and contingent compensation in trade credit, venture capital, and internal capital markets.

Date: 2026-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cfn and nep-mic
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