On Conservative Stable Standard of Behavior and Perfect Coalitional Equilibrium

S. Nageeb Ali and Ce Liu

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Abstract: We show that in Greenberg (1989)'s coalitional repeated game situation, every nondiscriminating Conservative Stable Standard of Behavior is a subset of the set of Perfect Coalitional Equilibrium (Ali and Liu 2026) paths. Moreover, the set of Perfect Coalitional Equilibrium paths itself is a nondiscriminating Conservative Stable Standard of Behavior. The set of Perfect Coalitional Equilibrium paths is therefore the maximal nondiscriminating Conservative Stable Standard of Behavior.

Date: 2026-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mac and nep-mic
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