Daycare Matching with Siblings: Social Implementation and Welfare Evaluation

Kan Kuno, Daisuke Moriwaki and Yoshihiro Takenami

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: In centralized matching markets, agents may value joint assignment, as with siblings or couples. Standard preference estimation ignores such complementarities, complicating welfare analysis of priority rules for paired assignment. We develop an empirical framework incorporating these preferences and apply it to Japanese daycare assignment. Families face both additional commuting distance and a fixed disutility from split assignment. We estimate the latter at 4.61 commuting-kilometer equivalents. Our fixed-report counterfactual estimates that the reform increased mean welfare by 0.032 kilometer-equivalent units. Ignoring sibling complementarity understates welfare gains for households applying simultaneously for multiple children by about 27%.

Date: 2026-04, Revised 2026-10
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