Antitrust on Aisle Five: How Well Do Divestiture Remedies Work?

Xiao Dong, Paul Koh, Devesh Raval, Dominic Smith and Brett Wendling

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Antitrust authorities frequently rely on structural divestitures to address competitive concerns raised by mergers. Using census-level establishment data and proprietary transaction records from the U.S. grocery sector, we provide systematic evidence on the long-run effects of such remedies. Divested stores experience an average 31 percent decline in employment over five years, driven by elevated exit rates and persistent contraction among surviving establishments. Sales similarly decline. Transaction-level evidence indicates that divested assets are systematically weaker and are often transferred to lower-capability buyers. These findings suggest that structural remedies may be less effective when the implementation of divestitures allows merging parties substantial discretion over the assets and buyers involved.

Date: 2026-04
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