The Econometrics of Matching with Transferable Utility: A Progress Report

Pierre-Andre Chiappori, Dam Linh Nguyen and Bernard Salanié

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Abstract: Since Choo and Siow (2006), a burgeoning literature has analyzed matching markets when utility is perfectly transferable and the joint surplus is separable. We take stock of recent methodological developments in this area. Combining theoretical arguments and simulations, we show that the separable approach is reasonably robust to omitted variables and/or non-separabilities. We conclude with a caveat on data requirements and imbalanced datasets.

Date: 2026-04
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