Perceived Social Norms under Uncertainty

Senran Lin

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: This paper proposes a belief-based framework for social norms in environments where individuals choose a single action. Relaxing the assumption that the appropriateness standard is common knowledge, the framework allows individuals to be uncertain about this standard and to hold heterogeneous assessments and beliefs about others' assessments. Within the framework, perceived injunctive social norms, personal values, and empirical expectations, while distinct, are systematically connected through a common informational structure. The framework further clarifies how disclosed information shapes perceived norms: its effect depends on what is disclosed, whether it is publicly or privately revealed, and how the disclosed statistic encodes underlying private cues.

Date: 2026-04, Revised 2026-04
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