Sharing the proceeds from a hierarchical venture when agents have needs

R. Pablo Arribillaga, Juan Moreno-Ternero and Pablo Neme

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Abstract: We consider a setting in which a set of agents are hierarchically organized for a joint venture. They each generate revenues for the joint venture and have individual needs to cover. The aim is to distribute aggregate revenues appropriately. We characterize a family of need-adjusted geometric rules where the net revenue (after covering needs) "bubbles up" in the hierarchy, as well as a need-adjusted serial rule in which the net revenue is equally shared among each agent and his predecessors in the hierarchy.

Date: 2026-04
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