Fair Commodity Taxation

Eric Gao and Daniel Luo

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We study economies where consumers interact independently with many monopolists. When consumer valuations over goods are correlated, correlation can distort the induced distribution of consumer surplus (information rents). We identify which shifts in the correlation structure over values makes the induced distribution more or less fair, in the sense of second order stochastic dominance. We then investigate the role taxation can have on information rents, and show the tax authority never benefits from randomizing the allocation of goods. We characterize the set of mechanisms that are on the fairness-efficiency frontier under regularity conditions on the distribution of types. Furthermore, under these conditions all allocations on the fairness-efficiency frontier ration the good more than an unregulated monopolist. Finally, we discuss implications of our model for luxury commodity taxation.

Date: 2026-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-pbe
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