Coordination in complex environments

Pietro Dall'Ara

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Coordination is an important aspect of innovative contexts, where: the more innovative a course of action, the more uncertain its outcome. To study the interplay of coordination and informational ``complexity'', I embed a beauty-contest game into a complex environment. I identify a new conformity phenomenon. This effect may push towards the exploration of unknown alternatives or constitute a status-quo bias, depending on the network structure of players' interactions. In an application, I show that an organization with decentralized authority can implement profit maximization in a sufficiently complex environment.

Date: 2026-04
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