ValueBlindBench: Agreement-Gated Stress Testing of LLM-Judged Investment Rationales Before Returns Are Observable

Sidi Chang, Peiying Zhu and Yuxiao Chen

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: LLM-based financial agents increasingly produce investment rationales before the outcomes needed to evaluate them are observable. This creates a delayed-ground-truth evaluation problem: realized returns remain the eventual arbiter of investment quality, but they arrive too late and are too noisy to guide many model-development and governance decisions. LLM judges offer a tempting shortcut for pre-deployment evaluation of AI-finance systems, but unvalidated judges may reward verbosity, confidence, or rubric mimicry rather than financial judgment. This paper introduces ValueBlindBench, a preregistered agreement-gated stress-test protocol for deciding when LLM-judged investment-rationale claims are publishable, qualified, or invalid. In a controlled market-state capital-allocation prototype with 1,000 honest decision cycles and 100 preregistered adversarial controls (1,100 trajectories, 5,500 judge calls), ValueBlindBench clears the aggregate agreement gate at \(\bar{\kappa}_w = 0.7168\) but prevents several overclaims. Lower-rank systems collapse into a tie-class, one rubric dimension fails the per-dimension gate (\texttt{constraint\_awareness}, \(\bar{\kappa}_w = 0.2022\)), single-judge rankings are family-dependent, and terse-correct rationales receive a \(\Delta = -2.81\) rubric-point penalty relative to honest rationales. A targeted anchor-specificity probe further shows that financial constructs such as constraint awareness are operationally load-bearing. The scientific object is therefore not a leaderboard and not a claim to measure true investment skill. ValueBlindBench is a pre-calibration metrology layer for AI-finance evaluation: it governs whether a proposed LLM-judge-based investment-rationale claim is stable enough, agreed enough, and uncontaminated enough to be reported at all.

Date: 2026-04, Revised 2026-05
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2604.25224 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2604.25224

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().