Dynamic Cheap Talk without Feedback

Atulya Jain

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We study a dynamic sender-receiver game in which the sender observes a state evolving according to a Markov chain but does not observe the receiver's action. Despite the absence of feedback, dynamic interaction partially restores commitment. We show that any equilibrium payoff of a persuasion model with partial commitment, where the sender can deviate to signaling policies that preserve the marginal distribution over messages, can be achieved as a uniform equilibrium payoff in the dynamic game. Moreover, any convex combination of such payoffs across message distributions can also be sustained. When the sender's payoff is state-independent, she achieves the Bayesian persuasion payoff.

Date: 2026-04
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