RSDM: The Consensus Honest Money in the AI Era

Boliang Lin and Ruixi Lin

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: The medium of exchange of the traditional economy is mainly the fiat currency of each country or region, and when cross-border transactions occur, they need to be settled according to the exchange rate. In the AI world, however, the medium of exchange tends to be a globally recognized currency. Especially when AI acts as an agent for cross-border capital pool and cross cyclical asset allocation, it needs a sound money that can resist the depreciation of fiat currency and store long-term value. Therefore, we propose a globally consensus and universally accepted monetary rule framework for the AI era. The devaluation of money runs through almost the whole process of history, from the weight reduction and purity decrease of metallic coin to the unanchored over-issuance of paper currency. Whether it is the periodic compulsory recoinage in medieval Europe or Gesell's stamp scrip, both are essentially mechanisms for taxing money holdings. Unlike Gesell's stamp scrip, Redeemable Self-Decaying/Devaluing Money (RSDM) is a tokenized commodity money. Its essential innovation is to fill the hole in the storage fee of metal coins through the self-devaluing of metal weight recorded on the deposit certificate (warehouse receipt) of metal coins. In a sense, RSDM is an innovative version of Jiaozi (a deposit receipt for base metal coin that emerged in Sichuan, China, about a thousand years ago). In this paper, we propose five forms of online and offline issuance of RSDM, providing a prototype for creating a globally recognized modern honest money.

Date: 2026-04
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