Empirical Evaluation of Deadline-Resolved Information Leakage on Documented Polymarket Insider Cases

Maksym Nechepurenko

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Abstract: This paper reports an end-to-end empirical evaluation of the deadline-Information Leakage Score (ILS-dl) extension introduced in the companion methodology paper. The deadline-ILS extends the original ILS to deadline-resolved prediction-market contracts, the dominant structural form of publicly documented insider trading on Polymarket. We anchor the evaluation in the 2026 U.S.-Iran conflict cluster of the ForesightFlow Insider Cases (FFIC) inventory, the largest documented deadline cluster. The evaluation has four parts: per-category exponential-hazard estimation, a single-case ILS-dl computation, cross-market wallet analysis, and methodological refinements. Hazard-rate estimation produces an adequate exponential fit for military-geopolitics markets (KS p = 0.609, half-life 2.3 days) and a preliminary fit for corporate-disclosure markets (n = 5). The regulatory-decision category is rejected as bimodal (p = 0.013). On the largest applicable FFIC contract ("US forces enter Iran by April 30," $269M volume), the article-derived public-event timestamp yields ILS-dl = +0.113 versus a resolution-anchored proxy value of -0.331: a 0.444 shift in magnitude on opposite sides of zero, demonstrating that the extension distinguishes signal from proxy artefact. Pre-event drift is mild, and short-window variants (30-min, 2-hour) are exactly zero. Cross-market wallet analysis identifies 332 wallets active in both major Iran-cluster markets, but the available trade history covers only the resolution-settlement window.

Date: 2026-05
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