Skill Premia and Pre-Marital Investments in Marriage Markets

Aditya Kuvalekar

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: I study a decentralized marriage market with search frictions, costly pre-marital skill investments, and non-transferable utility. Despite a symmetric environment, the market can exhibit asymmetric equilibria, with one gender investing more in skills than the other; in some environments, the asymmetric equilibrium is unique. A microfounded model of household utility maximization shows that this transition from a unique symmetric equilibrium to a unique asymmetric equilibrium can be driven by rising labor-market wages for high-skilled workers: as the skill premium rises, one gender ends up fully investing while the other invests substantially less.

Date: 2026-05, Revised 2026-05
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