Designing Persuasive Experiments

Karun Adusumilli and Abhi Vemulapati

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Incentives in experimental design are often misaligned: experimenters design and finance experiments to seek regulatory approval, while regulators seek to maximize social-welfare. We propose a framework to resolve this conflict, wherein regulators set a minimum expected welfare threshold, and experimenters optimize designs subject to this constraint. It requires no knowledge of experimenters' private preferences or costs and mitigates strategic Bayesian persuasion. Under normal priors, sampling according to the Neyman-allocation is always optimal, independent of the specific objectives. Furthermore, we characterize the optimal stopping-rule. In a numerical study calibrated to historical clinical-trial data, our framework reduces expected sample-sizes by over 48% relative to classical designs that attain the same social-welfare.

Date: 2026-05
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