The Full Pareto Frontier as Kantian Equilibria

Igor Sloev and Gerasimos Lianos

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Multiplicative Kantian equilibrium explains cooperative behavior in social dilemmas without abandoning methodological individualism. However, its outcomes depend critically on the parametrization of the strategy space - the property of strategic non-equivalence. We investigate what fraction of the Pareto frontier can be attained by varying the strategy space. We show that the set of achievable Kantian equilibria is the entire Pareto frontier: for any interior Pareto-efficient point there exists a shift of coordinates - imposing lower bounds on actions - that makes it a Multiplicative Kantian equilibrium. The proof is constructive and relies on a intuitive geometric property: moving the origin to a point on the common tangent to players' indifference curves. This result separates the problem of efficiency from the problem of fairness, allowing any normative criterion to be implemented without loss of Pareto optimality.

Date: 2026-05
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