When Do Markets Work? Multiplex Networks and Efficiency

Chengqing Li, Yves Zenou and Junjie Zhou

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Abstract: We study an Arrow-Debreu economy with externalities generated by multiplex networks. Market equilibrium prices reflect both the preferences and scarcity of goods, consumers' network centralities arising from goods' externalities, as well as linkages across goods (layers) through the budget constraint. Despite the presence of externalities, competitive markets can still be efficient: the First and Second Welfare Theorems hold if either all networks are regular or all layers share the same network structure. When markets allocate goods inefficiently, a Lindahl equilibrium-implemented through personalized prices-can restore efficiency, but may leave some consumers worse off.

Date: 2026-05
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