Imperfect Commitment in Maximal Extractable Value Auctions

Aleksei Adadurov, Sergey Barseghyan, Anton Chtepine, Antero Eloranta, Andrei Sebyakin and Arsenii Valitov

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Ethereum block builders run sealed auctions among searchers, but nothing in the protocol forces a builder to honor the auction outcome after observing submitted bundles. This paper studies the commitment problem. We model a builder who defects with probability $\varepsilon$ and, upon defection, replicates a type-specific fraction $\gamma(\tau)$ of the winning MEV opportunity. Searchers anticipate this behavior and choose between a risky first-price bid and a safe deterrence bid that makes frontrunning unprofitable. The resulting equilibrium is piecewise, with the cost of imperfect commitment depending jointly on replicability and competition. Using the libMEV dataset, we estimate $\gamma(\tau)$ from right-tail bribe plateaus and decompose observed auction revenue against the surplus a defecting builder could capture. The results show sharp heterogeneity across MEV types: sandwich opportunities are already highly competitive, while naked arbitrage and liquidations leave substantially more surplus exposed to builder defection. Credible MEV auctions, therefore, require not only an auction format, but also constraints on the builder's ability to use observed bid and payload information ex post.

Date: 2026-05, Revised 2026-05
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