Dividing the Spoils in Team Contests

Zhonghong Kuang, Jingfeng Lu and Yiyao Zhu

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Teams frequently compete on multiple fronts: political parties contest districts for majority control, contractors field specialized units to win procurement contracts, and squads play match by match for titles. Although the prize accrues collectively to the winning team, individual incentives depend on how it is divided internally. We study a majoritarian team contest in which two rival managers simultaneously divide their teams' prizes among heterogeneous members. The contest admits a unique pure-strategy equilibrium: both managers choose identical relative allocations -- regardless of heterogeneity in winning values or player costs -- with each battle's share proportional to its discriminatory power, symmetry, and pivotality.

Date: 2026-05
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