Robustness of Persuasion to Receiver Preferences

Ronen Gradwohl, Fengming Hu and Rann Smorodinsky

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We study the robustness of Bayesian persuasion to (Knightian) uncertainty about the receiver's preferences. We consider two properties: continuity, in which only the modeler lacks precise knowledge while the model's predictions are nonetheless accurate; and robustness, in which the sender also lacks precise knowledge, but where the outcome is insensitive to this ignorance. For the latter, we model the sender's behavior as either maximizing worst-case utility or minimizing the regret. We show that the notions are equivalent. In addition, they are equivalent to robustness to tie-breaking. Finally, we show that robustness holds generically.

Date: 2026-05, Revised 2026-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-upt
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