Self-Duality and Transfer in Voting Games

Takaaki Abe

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: This study examines the role of self-duality in the axiomatization of the Shapley-Shubik power index. We show that, when self-duality is imposed, the transfer axiom can be weakened to a restricted version requiring transfer only among voting games with no veto player. This result shows that self-duality can partially substitute for the transfer axiom.

Date: 2026-05, Revised 2026-06
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