Strategic Type Spaces

Olivier Gossner and Rafael Veiel

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Abstract: We provide a strategic foundation for information: in any given game with incomplete information we define strategic quotients as information representations that are sufficient for players to compute best-responses to other players. We prove 1/ existence and essential uniqueness of a minimal strategic quotient called the Strategic Type Space (STS) in which a type is given by an interim correlated rationalizability hierarchy and represents a set of beliefs over other players' types and nature that rationalize this hierarchy and 2/ that the minimal STS has a recursive structure that is captured by a finite automaton.

Date: 2026-06
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