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Sequential Search with Planning

Ruhi Sonal, Saptarshi Mukherjee, Abhinaba Lahiri and Aniruddha Ghosh

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Abstract: Sequential development of a new product or technology, or natural resource exploration, often progresses through ordered stages with uncertain rewards and requires costly (ex ante) planning to make future stages accessible. We model this process as an ordered Pandora's box problem where a decision-maker first chooses an initial scope, paying a cost that rises with the number of stages made accessible, and may later expand the scope at a marginal adjustment cost. Since the paid planning costs are sunk, the continuation values depend on the state variable ``paid scope''. We prove existence and uniqueness of scope-dependent reservation values, characterize the optimal search strategy as a threshold rule indexed by paid scope, and derive comparative statics. Interactions among three economic forces shape the optimal behavior -- a guarantee effect (a higher current best offer reduces the expected improvement from the next stage and induces earlier stopping), a paid-scope effect (a larger prepaid scope lowers the marginal cost of future access, raises the continuation value, and supports continuation at higher guarantees), and a remaining-horizon effect (fewer stages remaining shrink the option value of continuing). Two examples illustrate how these forces generate distinct planning and search patterns under normal and fat-tailed rewards.

Date: 2026-06
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