Consistent Probabilistic Social Choice Revisited

Florian Brandl and Felix Brandt

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Abstract: Brandt et al. (2016) characterized a probabilistic social choice function known as maximal lotteries within a framework based on fractional preference profiles, which abstracts away from individual voters. While this modeling assumption enables a more elegant and transparent proof, it complicates comparison with other results in the literature. The purpose of this note is to transfer their results to the standard model of social choice, where each preference profile is defined for a finite number of voters. Along the way, we prove a slightly stronger version of their main theorem that uses a weaker continuity condition and allows for real-valued (rather than only rational-valued) probabilities.

Date: 2026-06
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