 Battery Bidding under Price Uncertainty in Wholesale Electricity MarketsVincent Yinjun-Wang and Madeleine Udell Abstract: Grid-scale batteries increasingly influence outcomes in wholesale electricity markets, but their observed bid patterns remain difficult to interpret. In particular, bids that appear to reflect strategic withholding may instead arise from rational operations under price uncertainty and risk management. We develop an asset-level model of a price-taking battery that submits stepwise buy and sell bid curves in the day-ahead market under a finite set of price scenarios. The battery chooses quantity--price pairs to maximize a mean--CVaR objective subject to physical and market constraints. A direct formulation is a mixed-integer linear program, but we show that its integer decisions can be removed, yielding an exact linear programming reformulation suitable for empirical analysis. Our empirical results deliver three insights. First, withholding behavior can arise even without market power, because scarce stored energy and uncertain future prices increase the value of holding energy. Second, the effect of uncertainty depends on the state of charge: when stored energy is scarce, greater uncertainty raises sell bid prices, whereas when stored energy is abundant it can lower them. Third, risk management reshapes bid curves into layered structures that secure profitable execution across a broad set of scenarios while preserving some exposure to rare but valuable price spikes. Date: 2026-06 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2606.14050 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Papers from arXiv.org |
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