A game of information

Dorje C. Brody

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: A game of information concerns two players transmitting messages that are obscured by noise. A receiver digests the combination of the two information sources and makes an assessment rationally. The aim of the players is to generate opposing assessments for the receiver by choosing signal-to-noise ratios of their information. It is shown that this problem can be reduced into an elementary infinite game on the square, thus admitting a complete equilibrium solution. Three generalisations of the game are proposed.

Date: 2026-06
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