A game of information

Dorje C. Brody

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: A game of information concerns two players transmitting messages that are obscured by noise. A receiver digests the combination of the two information sources and makes an assessment rationally. The aim of the players is to generate opposing assessments for the receiver by choosing optimal signal-to-noise ratios of their information. It is shown that this problem can be reduced into an elementary infinite game on the square, thus admitting a complete equilibrium solution. The problem is extended to allow for one player to disseminate disinformation, for which the optimal strategies become more intricate. Further generalisations of the game are proposed.

Date: 2026-06, Revised 2026-07
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