Pareto Optimal Centralized Risk Sharing with Multiple Agents: Inclusivity and Fairness

Debora Daniela Escobar and Wing Fung Chong

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: This paper studies centralized risk sharing with endogenous prices. Multiple policyholders transfer risks to a central insurer through indemnity decisions, while prices are determined by pricing functionals applied to ceded risks. The resulting problem is multiobjective, with Pareto optimality as the natural efficiency criterion. We show that classical Pareto optimality may fail to reveal whether all agents are represented in a balanced decision process that scalarized objectives may assign zero weight to some agents, and group aggregates may obscure individual risk positions. Motivated by bilateral Pareto characterizations through sequential optimization, we introduce inclusive and fair Pareto optimality, a representation-based refinement requiring every agent to appear exactly once, either individually or as part of a group, in a finite ordered sequence of optimizations. Our main result proves equivalence between this concept and balanced sequential optimization, placing it between Geoffrion-proper Pareto optimality and classical Pareto optimality. An illustrative example demonstrates the framework using the Expected Shortfall.

Date: 2026-06
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